What a cyber type approval actually proves: RaaEDGE and IACS UR E27
For most of the last decade, cyber security on board was something the supplier told you about. You read the brochure, asked a few questions in the procurement round and took the answers on trust. On 1 July 2024 that started to change. Two unified requirements from the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) became mandatory for newbuilds contracted from that date: UR E26 on the cyber resilience of ships, and UR E27 on the cyber resilience of on-board systems and equipment.
Below we go through what the two rules do, what an approval like ours does and doesn’t prove, and why it matters if you rely on vessel data.
Two rules, one ship
The rules split the problem in two.
UR E26 covers the ship as a whole. It puts obligations on the shipyard, the system integrator and, over the ship’s life, the owner. The ship needs an inventory of its computer-based systems, a network divided into security zones with controlled connections between them, and the ability to detect, respond to and recover from an incident. The logic is the familiar one: identify, protect, detect, respond, recover.
UR E27 covers the equipment that goes into the ship. It sets requirements for suppliers of computer-based systems, and it is how class checks that a product can support the ship-level design E26 asks for. A system has to provide a defined set of security capabilities taken from the industrial standard IEC 62443-3-3, and the supplier has to show how the product is developed, configured, maintained and changed over its life.
The two depend on each other. An integrator can’t build a segmented, defensible network from equipment that can’t authenticate users, doesn’t log what happens to it, or quietly opens connections to the internet. E27 is how class checks the parts before E26 checks the whole.
Anything that connects onboard systems to shore is in scope. A data collector sits on the ship’s operational network on one side and a satellite link to the cloud on the other, so the rules were written with systems like it in mind.
What the approval covers
RaaEDGE holds a Bureau Veritas Type Approval Certificate as a Cyber Ship-Shore Data Sharing System under IACS UR E27 Rev.1 (September 2023), “Cyber resilience of on-board systems and equipment”. It was assessed together with Bureau Veritas’ own cyber security rules (NR659) at Security Level 1.
The approval covers the onboard RaaEDGE platform in its certified configuration, the edge computing component of our vessel data layer. Our cloud services are outside the scope. That’s normal, since E27 is a rule for equipment on the ship and says nothing about what happens once the data reaches shore. Raa Labs’ cloud security is handled through a separate information security management programme.
The review was thorough. Bureau Veritas went through the full documentation set the rule requires: asset inventory, network topology, a description of every security capability, security configuration guidelines, secure development lifecycle, maintenance and verification plans, incident response and recovery, and management of change. It then carried out a type inspection, where all 41 test cases in the approved test procedure were run on the hardware and passed.
What it proves
A type approval is an independent class society saying that a specific product, in a specific configuration, meets a specific rule. For a data collector, that turns a list of supplier claims into something a third party has reviewed and tested. Four of those claims matter most to an owner deciding what to put on board.
It can’t touch the vessel’s control systems. RaaEDGE has no control functions. It sends no commands or control signals to navigation, propulsion or machinery systems. Data flows in from them, and the collector’s firewall blocks everything else. It sits between the ship’s operational and IT networks as a buffer, not a bridge.
Remote access is the exception. No inbound ports are open to the internet, and nobody can reach the unit from shore unless access has been approved from the vessel side. Once approved, access needs multi-factor authentication over an encrypted tunnel and is limited in time, and every session is logged with an accurate timestamp. How approval works on board is agreed with the owner.
Data is encrypted where it is most exposed. Data leaving the ship is encrypted in transit with modern authenticated encryption. The disk is encrypted at rest with keys bound to the hardware, so a disk taken out of the unit can’t be read elsewhere.
The configuration you approve is the one that runs. The operating system is defined declaratively, there is no package manager for installing software at runtime, and every change goes through a controlled deployment that rolls back automatically if it fails. Configuration drift, the slow gap between what was documented and what is actually on the ship, is one of the most common weaknesses in onboard IT. Here it is much harder to introduce, and it gets caught when it does happen.
What it does not prove
A certificate is easy to oversell, so here is what this one doesn’t do.
A type approval covers the product. It doesn’t make a ship E26 compliant. Ship-level cyber resilience is the responsibility of the shipyard or systems integrator and the shipowner, and it depends on how the whole vessel network is designed and operated. What an E27-approved component does is make that work easier and cheaper. The RaaEDGE E27 documentation, from the asset inventory to the topology and security configuration guidelines, is written to feed straight into the vessel-level E26 deliverables, so the evidence class will ask for on that component already exists.
It also stops at the box on board. The certificate says nothing about cloud services, ours or anyone else’s, and an owner should assess the shore side of any data chain separately.
And it is not a guarantee that nothing will go wrong. Security Level 1 protects against casual or coincidental violation, which is the baseline the rules set for onboard equipment. What the approval does show is that the processes for patching, change and incident response exist and have been reviewed. That matters because the threat picture will keep moving long after the certificate is issued. Our ambition is to keep our security posture certified to the level that fits the role we play.
Newbuilds. For ships contracted from 1 July 2024, onboard systems in scope need to show they meet E27, either through a type approval or a vessel-specific assessment by class. A type-approved collector makes that faster for the yard and the owner. Buyers increasingly ask for classification approval in requests for quotation, and we expect that to become routine.
The existing fleet. E26 and E27 formally apply to new ships, but that is no reason to accept lower standards of equipment on a 15-year-old vessel. Many of the ships operating in 2040 are already built. Fitting approved equipment now means you won’t have to revisit the decision when expectations catch up, as they tend to.
Supplier due diligence. Cyber due diligence on onboard equipment is slow when every supplier is assessed from scratch. An independent approval answers most of the questions once, in a form the owner’s IT security team, the charterer and class can all review.
Trust in the data. Operational data is only useful if it can be trusted, and that starts at the point of collection. If the data passes through a device nobody has verified, its integrity can be argued about, whether it ends up in an emissions report, a performance claim or a charter party dispute.
Our view
Cyber requirements will tighten, not relax. They are already changing what owners and yards ask of onboard suppliers, and we think that is good for the industry. It separates infrastructure built to sit on a ship’s operational network for decades from equipment that was never designed for it.
For us, the approval confirms how we built the layer: upstream, close to the vessel’s systems, on the assumption that whatever sits between the ship and the cloud is the part of the chain you can least afford to get wrong.

Glenn Tvetmarken
Head of Platform Engineering
Glenn writes about infrastructure, cloud and cyber security.
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